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Abstract
This is a checklist of actions for healthcare, public health, nongovernmental organizations, and 
private entities to use to strengthen the resilience of their community’s health sector to disasters. It 
is informed by the experience of Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey and analyzed in 
the context of findings from other recent natural disasters in the United States. The health sector is 
defined very broadly, including—in addition to hospitals, emergency medical services (EMS), and 
public health agencies—healthcare providers, outpatient clinics, long-term care facilities, home 
health providers, behavioral health providers, and correctional health services. It also includes 
community-based organizations that support these entities and represent patients. We define health 
sector resilience very broadly, including all factors that preserve public health and healthcare 
delivery under extreme stress and contribute to the rapid restoration of normal or improved health 
sector functioning after a disaster. We present the key findings organized into 8 themes. We then 
describe a conceptual map of health sector resilience that ties these themes together. Lastly, we 
provide a series of recommended actions for improving health sector resilience at the local level. 
The recommended actions emphasize those items that individuals who experienced Hurricane 
Sandy deemed to be most important. The recommendations are presented as a checklist that can be 
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used by a variety of interested parties who have some role to play in disaster preparedness, 
response, and recovery in their own communities. Following a general checklist are supplemental 
checklists that apply to specific parts of the larger health sector.
Keywords
Hurricane Sandy; Resilience; Health sector; Checklist; Public health preparedness/response; 
Medical management/response; Hospital preparedness/response
The goal of this project was to develop an evidence-informed checklist that outlines action 
steps for medical and public health authorities, in partnership with nongovernmental 
organizations and private industry, to assess and strengthen the resilience of their 
community’s health sector in the face of disasters. Many disasters share common 
characteristics. Therefore, elements of health sector preparedness and resilience can apply to 
a range of hazards, which have been described elsewhere and form the basis of official 
guidance.1–3 We posited that, in addition to official guidance, there is much to be learned 
from the lived experience of those who played a role in preparing for, responding to, and 
recovering from an actual disaster. They are best able to judge which factors were most 
important to facilitating the resilience of the health sector in which they work and live. 
Additionally, we believe that compiling the judgments of a diverse sample of individuals is a 
more reliable means of assessing health sector resilience than relying solely on the 
perspectives of a few experts. Consequently, this checklist is informed by the experiences of 
communities directly affected by Hurricane Sandy in 2012.
Although not every lesson from an advance-notice event like a hurricane will apply to no-
notice events like an earthquake or tornado, many will. Therefore, because many disasters 
share common elements that have an impact on health sector resilience, we believe this 
checklist will have broad applicability and can be useful for natural disasters, including but 
not limited to hurricanes and coastal storms, as well as other emergencies in a variety of 
locales, especially those emergencies that result in a loss of critical infrastructure.
We define the health sector very broadly. This sector includes organizations that have long 
been at the center of preparedness efforts, such as hospitals, emergency medical services 
(EMS), and public health departments, as well as many entities that have not routinely been 
part of preparedness efforts. Among these are outpatient clinics, long-term care facilities, 
home health providers (both formal home health agencies and informal care provided by 
family and friends), behavioral health providers, correctional health services, and the 
healthcare providers who work in all of these settings, as well as the unions that represent 
them. The health sector also includes community-based organizations that support these 
entities and represent the patients who receive services from them.
We also define health sector resilience very broadly to include any action taken during any 
phase of the emergency management cycle (ie, mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
recovery) and any pre-event attribute of the community that preserves public health and 
healthcare delivery under extreme stress and contributes to the rapid restoration and/or 
adaption of normal (or improved) health sector functioning after a disaster. This includes 
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inherent factors such as the underlying health and wealth of a population and the 
effectiveness of elected leaders and local, state, and federal agencies.4 It also includes 
factors that foster greater adaptiveness in a crisis such as improvisation and problem solving 
by all parts of the health sector, the effectiveness of incident command structure, the extent 
of collaboration between various parts of the health sector, and the availability and 
effectiveness of mutual aid and outside resources.4 While acknowledging that several 
factors, such as current health status, socioeconomic indicators (including levels of 
inequality), and social capital, can contribute to the resilience of a community that 
experiences a disaster, we have focused primarily on those relatively short-term 
interventions that stakeholders in communities can implement before an event to improve 
the resilience of their communities. These include interventions that either reduce the risk of 
adverse outcomes or improve the resilience to those damaging events that cannot be avoided.
The Story of Hurricane Sandy
Hurricane Sandy formed in the Caribbean very late in the hurricane season on October 22, 
2012. It traveled parallel to the US East Coast before taking a very unusual turn to the west 
and merging with an intense cold front, forming a unique “superstorm.” The eye of the 
storm made landfall on the central New Jersey coast on October 29, 2012. The storm pushed 
a surge of water up the mouth of the Hudson River, reaching an unprecedented 14 feet at 
Battery Park on the southern tip of Manhattan. The storm caused tremendous damage along 
the entire New Jersey coast and devastated parts of barrier islands of Long Island. Officials 
had many days’ warning of the storm, but the height of the storm surge and the extent of 
damage far exceeded official forecasts. In the end, Sandy killed at least 117 people,5 injured 
more than 4,000,6 and was the second most costly hurricane in US history, causing an 
estimated $67.7 billion in damages.7 (The costliest was Hurricane Katrina, which caused 
$152.2 billion worth of damages to the Gulf Coast region in 2005.)
Sandy was preceded a year earlier by Hurricane Irene. Irene was expected to be very severe 
in and around New York, and as a precaution a number of hospitals and other healthcare 
facilities evacuated in advance. Although Irene did cause severe flooding in upstate New 
York and New England, it mostly spared New York City.8 In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Irene, many in New York felt that the evacuations had been an unnecessary overreaction.9 
These feelings were still fresh as Sandy approached.
In New Jersey, Sandy’s wind and storm surge created great damage along the entire coast, 
extending a considerable distance inland. Roads and bridges were blocked, infrastructure 
was damaged, and millions of people were displaced from their homes. Two hospitals were 
evacuated—one prior to Sandy’s landfall in anticipation of flooding and one after impact 
due to damage sustained from flooding. In New York City, subway tunnels flooded, and the 
electrical and steam service to portions of lower Manhattan had to be shut off. Electrical 
power was lost to most of the remainder of lower Manhattan when an explosion occurred at 
a ConEd substation. Two hospitals in Manhattan, New York Presbyterian Lower Manhattan 
Division and the New York Veterans Administration Hospital, had evacuated preemptively 
before the storm. Two large hospitals located next to the East River in lower Manhattan, 
New York University Langone and Bellevue, decided not to evacuate in advance and 
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suffered flooding of their basements that resulted in loss of emergency power and 
subsequent evacuations.10 Coney Island Hospital in Brooklyn was also evacuated post-
landfall due to flooding and storm damage. One other hospital on Long Island, Long Beach 
Medical Center, was evacuated as a precaution in advance of the storm but was so severely 
damaged that it never reopened.11 A psychiatric hospital on Staten Island, South Beach 
Psychiatric Center, also evacuated, as did 2 hospitals in New Jersey: Hoboken Hospital (in 
advance) and Palisades Medical Center (due to flooding). In total, across the region, 9 
hospitals were evacuated. In New York alone, hospital and nursing home evacuations 
involved approximately 6,300 patients.12 Of the evacuated hospitals in both states, 7 had 
provided emergency department services that were lost for days, weeks, months, or, in one 
case, forever. The decision making about healthcare facility evacuation was inconsistent and 
at times confused.13,14
In addition to the hospitals, more than 30 nursing homes were evacuated, and many more 
outpatient facilities, including offices, clinics, dialysis centers, and behavioral health clinics 
were forced to close. Healthcare workers and patients had difficulty getting to healthcare 
facilities because of closed roads and lack of fuel. In many cases these healthcare facilities 
were closed for weeks or in some cases months. Home health care, both formal care 
provided by professionals and informal care provided by families and friends, was also 
disrupted. Given the population of 20 million in the New York metropolitan statistical area at 
the time of the storm,15 most of which was significantly affected by the storm, it is 
reasonable to estimate that several million people, especially the most vulnerable members 
of society, were displaced from their normal sources of care for a period of time, and many 
of these had to attempt to seek care elsewhere. For example, elderly, homeless, and 
chronically ill people used emergency departments significantly more than did the general 
population after the storm,16 and 95% of primary care sites in the Rockaways temporarily 
closed or relocated.17 The healthcare facilities that remained open, or that were able to 




We reviewed scholarly literature on health sector preparedness and resilience and after-
action reports, news reports, and other available documents related to the impact of 
Hurricane Sandy on the New York City metropolitan area’s health sector. Peer-reviewed 
publications were identified in PubMed using search terms including “Hurricane Sandy” and 
“Preparedness,” “Evacuation,” and “Resilience.”
In addition, literature that addresses the impact of other recent disasters on the health sector 
was also reviewed. Particular attention was paid to sources that provided data on or 
descriptions of the number and types of injuries and illness that were treated during and after 
a disaster. In total, we found 61 peer-reviewed articles and media reports worthy of 
inclusion. The results of the literature reviews informed the selection of participants and the 
themes discussed during the semi-structured interviews.
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Selection and Recruitment of Participants—From February to October 2015, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key informants from New York and New Jersey, 
as well as neighboring affected states, including Connecticut and Pennsylvania, to identify 
factors that either fostered or hindered resilience of the health sector to the effects of 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012. Potential interviewees were identified based on the study team’s 
prior knowledge of stakeholders operating in these jurisdictions, as well as extensive 
searches of news media and peer-reviewed literature to identify healthcare and public health 
organizations affected by Hurricane Sandy. Additional interviewees were added through 
snowball sampling. Interviewees included representatives from healthcare organizations 
(both government and private), trade and professional associations, public health 
organizations, and emergency management agencies. Interviewees possessed direct 
knowledge of the experiences of public health or healthcare organizations during Hurricane 
Sandy and, in most instances, had experienced the effects of the storm directly, in their own 
lives.
Data Collection and Analysis—A semi-structured interview guide was developed based 
on the literature review and the study team’s knowledge from prior Hurricane Sandy 
research and extensive experience in the field of public health emergency preparedness. 
Telephone interviews were conducted with 67 key informants between February and 
October 2015 by at least 2 members of the study team. One member of the team served as 
the primary interviewer, and the other member was a note taker. Interviews lasted 
approximately 30 minutes and were audio recorded and transcribed with participant 
permission. Study materials were labeled with unique, random identification numbers.
The interview team met regularly throughout data collection and analysis to discuss 
emergent themes and issues. A combined deductive and inductive approach was used to 
identify themes in interview transcripts and notes. A priori themes were selected on the basis 
of relevant literature and our research objectives. Additional themes were generated through 
open, unrestricted coding. Transcripts were coded using QSR NVivo for Mac v10.1.3 
(Burlington, MA). Ten percent of interview transcripts were co-coded by the 4 members of 
the study team who conducted all interviews. Coding was compared and discrepancies were 
adjudicated. When the team reached a consensus about themes and their application, the 
remaining transcripts were divided up among the team to be coded.
Focus Groups
Two 2-hour in-person focus groups were held to further explore themes that emerged during 
key informant interviews. On September 16, 2015, a focus group discussion was conducted 
with New Jersey emergency medical services providers. On September 17, 2015, a focus 
group was conducted dedicated to exploring the experiences and resilience of dialysis 
providers in the greater New York region. Potential participants were identified based on 
their organization and role during Hurricane Sandy (ie, they worked in either EMS or the 
dialysis field), during key informant interviews, or by referral of another focus group 
participant. Although focus group participants held different roles during Hurricane Sandy—
some provided direct care, while others served in coordinating or administrative capacities—
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all possessed first-hand knowledge about their subsection of the health sector and what 
fostered or hindered its resilience.
A list of key issues to explore was developed by the study team based on preliminary themes 
that emerged during key informant interviews and the aforementioned literature review. 
Focus groups were conducted as open-ended, facilitated discussions. At least 3 members of 
the interview team, 1 of whom served as a note taker, attended each focus group. Both focus 
groups were audio recorded and transcribed with participant permission and analyzed in the 
same manner as key informant interviews.
Limitations
This study was subject to several limitations. First, because the semi-structured interviews 
were conducted 2 to 3 years after the storm, there is the potential for recall bias among 
participants. In addition, because of the study design, the sample was not random and may 
not be representative of all those who were involved in the Sandy response.
Another potential limitation is the generalizability of our findings. The health sector in the 
New York City area is one of the most resource rich in the nation. The response to a similar 
event in another part of the county may have looked very different, as differences in bed 
capacity, health workforce, and other factors may adversely affect response, recovery, and 
resilience.
Finally, this qualitative study was conducted primarily to identify pertinent themes that, if 
applied, would strengthen the community’s health sector resilience. The authors made no 
attempt at a quantitative analysis.
The University of Pittsburgh’s Institutional Review Board determined this research was 
exempt from 45 CFR part 46 requirements.
Findings from the Research
The following are the most salient findings of this research based on experiences of the 
study participants from New York’s and New Jersey’s health sector.
• Health sector resilience reaches beyond public health agencies and hospitals to include 
home care, routine outpatient care, dialysis, behavioral health, substance abuse treatment, 
correctional health, medical transportation, and other auxiliary services
Disruption of these services adversely affects patients not only directly but also indirectly by 
placing an extraordinary burden on hospitals that are ill prepared for both the volume of 
patients and the types of problems that these patients experience. For example, hospitals 
have very limited capacity for dialysis since nearly all chronic dialysis is now done in the 
outpatient setting. Likewise, hospital emergency departments do not maintain stockpiles of 
methadone for patients on chronic maintenance programs and do not have much surge 
capacity for psychiatric patients displaced from their normal sites of care. Much of the post-
storm surge in emergency department volume was due to patients with chronic health 
problems being displaced from access to their normal care. Most of the preparedness 
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funding and attention over the years has gone to public health and hospital preparedness and 
very little to the rest of the health sector.
• Advance preparations, which strengthened organizational resilience to the storm, were 
uneven across different health facility types; this uneven preplanning led to cascading 
problems
Nonhospital residential facilities (eg, nursing homes, long-term care facilities, 
and adult care facilities) were less prepared and, therefore, inherently less 
resilient than hospitals—These facilities have had fewer emergency preparedness 
regulatory requirements and little emergency preparedness funding. Because they have small 
staffs, they rarely have anyone dedicated exclusively to emergency preparedness and 
typically have more difficulty assigning someone to be responsible for preparedness.
Some ancillary outpatient services were relatively more resilient because of 
their own independent preparedness activities—Some hemodialysis centers, 
substance abuse programs, and pharmacies displayed impressive resilience. They had 
planned and prepared for emergencies separate from the federal healthcare and public health 
preparedness programs. Generally, across several health sector components, facilities that 
were part of networks (eg, integrated health systems or chains) were better prepared and 
more resilient than stand-alone operations, because they had more resources and personnel 
to apply to preparedness and response activities.
Restoration of some healthcare services took a very long time, or did not 
occur at all, disrupting care for many patients—This was particularly true for 
certain health services in more geographically vulnerable sections of New York, such as the 
beach communities of the Rockaways and Long Beach. For example, the Joseph P. Addabbo 
Family Health Center and Long Beach Medical Center were both significantly affected by 
flooding during the storm and were forced to close, the latter permanently. As a result, 
health services in the Rockaways and Long Beach were severely disrupted. Had these 
facilities been more resilient, it is likely that there would have been less disruption of care 
and some of the secondary burden on other parts of the health sector could likely have been 
avoided.
• Vulnerable populations were less resilient, and special needs and medical shelters were 
inadequately planned
Individuals in these vulnerable population groups tend to have fewer 
resources and were often less prepared—Storm conditions easily splintered the 
already fragile support systems on which many vulnerable people (eg, elderly, young, 
chronically ill, addicted, poor, and non–English speaking people) relied, such as home-based 
care, public clinics, just-in-time medications, and public transportation. As a result, 
members of vulnerable populations comprised a disproportionate share of the load on acute 
care facilities. This is not unexpected, as it had been identified in many previous disasters, 
and individuals who are members of vulnerable populations are known to routinely 
experience significant inequality in resources as well as social status. Nonetheless, 
insufficient priority had been given to preparing these populations and those entities on 
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which they rely to be resilient and to readying hospitals to meet the surging service demands 
of these populations. In particular, the agencies and institutions that most frequently 
interface with those vulnerable populations have not historically been included in emergency 
planning or preparedness networks. As a result, 1 participant noted, “People who have 
mitigating factors and weren’t doing so well before the storm did not bounce back.”
In many locations there was insufficient capacity of special needs and 
medical shelters, and the mission, staffing, and concept of operation for such 
shelters had not adequately been considered prior to the storm—This lack of 
preparedness in shelters was manifested as:
■ lack of coordination,
■ lack of staffing,
■ unclear operational responsibilities,
■ poor communication with other components of the health sector,
■ spread of infectious diseases in the shelters,
■ problems with food quality,
■ lack of medication (including methadone), and
■ use of illicit drugs and the inability to access drug treatment programs.
• The scale and duration of the storm’s impacts heaped additional stress on the health 
sector in the form of unflagging patient demands and a fatigued healthcare workforce
With the aftermath of the storm lasting weeks or in some cases months, 
patients’ access to health care was disrupted for extended periods, resulting 
in prolonged burdens on the healthcare facilities that remained open—The 
overworking of personnel was compounded by work-related stress (eg, the high volume of 
patients and adverse working conditions facing staff because of power outages, evacuations, 
etc) and home-related stress (eg, many staff members had lost their own homes or had 
family members in need). In some cases, the fatigue and stress resulted in “compassion 
fatigue,” when personnel were no longer able to empathize with the victims or patients. The 
wide geographic scale of the disaster meant that a substantial number of personnel were 
unavailable to work because of loss of their homes, family care duties, or loss of 
transportation. This was a problem especially in communities dependent on volunteer 
emergency medical technicians.
External support and relief were desperately needed to handle the surge in 
patients and to backfill local personnel who were unable to report for work or 
who needed respite after days and weeks of sustained work with little sleep—
Because of the multistate scale of the disaster, however, aid was not as readily available as 
expected and often came from far away. The much-needed backup eventually included 
support via mutual aid (both in-state and out-of-state), out-of-state deployments through the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, and federal deployments through the 
National Disaster Medical System.
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• Critical infrastructure disruptions and the immobility of many “critical personnel” stifled 
care delivery both at home and in healthcare facilities
The loss of readily available vehicle fuel, electricity, electronic 
communications, and transportation threatened people with chronic health 
needs and greatly hindered the ability of healthcare facilities to respond—Fuel 
was hard to find because roads were closed, some refineries were shuttered, and many gas 
stations were without electricity. Emergency vehicles were given priority for fuel, but 
healthcare workers or first responders in their personal vehicles trying to get to and from 
work were not—nor were patients traveling in their personal vehicles. Furthermore, 
nonemergency patient transport services (eg, transport vans) were also not prioritized. This 
hindered transportation of patients and healthcare workers and compounded the 
transportation disruptions caused by the closure of major roads, bridges, and tunnels and the 
discontinuation of mass transit. Furthermore, fuel for generators became hard to find, which 
threatened facilities and patients dependent on emergency power. Widespread and prolonged 
electrical power outages affected patients and facilities across the entire region. In New 
Jersey, some members of the community showed up in hospital waiting rooms just to get 
access to electricity to charge their mobile telephones and battery-powered medical devices. 
Emergency power systems such as hospital emergency generators were not always reliable 
or sufficient for a prolonged power outage.
The definition of “essential personnel” was unclear, hindering the movement 
of the many different people who were needed to run healthcare facilities—
While some types of hospital workers were given priority for access to restricted roads and 
fuel, others were not. In a prolonged event, nearly all types of hospital workers are needed to 
keep facilities operating. Nonhospital healthcare workers were generally not recognized as 
essential workers for purposes of road access and fuel. Thus, for example, dialysis nurses 
had difficulty getting to the dialysis centers, thereby putting those patients at risk. Informal 
healthcare providers, such as family caregivers, were not considered at all. Judgments of 
who was and was not essential were not uniform across the greater New York and New 
Jersey area or even within the same jurisdiction. Often, an individual manning a roadblock 
or gas station made the determination.
• Unclear responsibilities and an underestimation of the potential storm impacts by some 
officials contributed to delayed and often chaotic healthcare facility evacuations
Patient movement from evacuated healthcare facilities was plagued by lack of 
coordination and miscommunication—In some instances, once a decision to evacuate 
a hospital had been made, processes for coordinating patient movement (how they were to 
be transferred—emergent or nonemergent—where they were to go, and how they were to get 
there) were unclear, and there was miscommunication between evacuating hospitals, 
emergency medical services, and receiving hospitals.
In at least 2 instances, there was a difference of opinion between EMS and a hospital about 
the urgency of evacuation and in turn the appropriate procedures to use. EMS viewed this 
patient movement as being similar to a fire evacuation in which speed and getting patients 
out of harm’s way were the priorities. In contrast, hospitals that evacuated before and during 
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the storm viewed the situation as being more like a normal patient transfer during which 
customary procedures in line with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA) are strictly adhered to. EMTALA requires that patients be stabilized prior to 
transport, transferred only for medical need, accompanied by qualified personnel, and in 
vehicles equipped for the level of care the patient requires. Furthermore, it requires that 
direct communication take place between transferring and receiving clinicians. The 
applicability of EMTALA to emergency evacuations was not clear. There was also confusion 
at 1 hospital about when an emergency begins (ie, is it an emergency if the storm hasn’t 
made landfall yet?). This confusion is particularly concerning given the significant time 
required for a hospital evacuation and the need to complete pre-storm evacuation prior to 
onset of dangerous storm conditions that would place EMS and patients at risk. Facilities 
that were part of networks (eg, integrated health systems and chains) for the most part 
attempted to keep evacuated patients within their own networks, even if this meant moving 
patients over a greater distance. This had the potential benefit of maintaining better 
continuity of care but complicated transportation and optimal distribution of patient load.
Prior hurricane experience was a double-edged sword, evoking more 
preparation in some cases and greater complacency in others—Prior experience 
with Hurricane Irene only 1 year before helped with preparations for Sandy by identifying 
preparedness gaps and providing useful experience. On the other hand, because Irene was 
not as severe as predicted in the greater New York City area, some officials and healthcare 
executives discounted warnings about the seriousness of the impending Hurricane Sandy. 
This and the financial impact of evacuation during Irene played a role in delaying 
evacuations. The evacuations that occurred during and after the storm were much less 
organized than those conducted in advance of the storm. Pre-storm evacuations were also 
easier—they had the luxury of power and therefore lights and elevators to execute 
evacuations—and consequently safer for staff who did not have to carry patients up and 
down stairs in the dark.
• Existing healthcare assets were creatively deployed, procedures adjusted, and prior 
relationships capitalized on to manage issues and problems as they emerged
Mobile health units of various types were very useful—A number of health-related 
entities, including pharmacies, hospitals, medical clinics, and substance abuse programs, 
own or have access to mobile units that they use for routine activities. During the response to 
Hurricane Sandy, these assets were deployed in various useful ways. Often this was done 
“on-the-fly,” as these mobile units had not previously been considered emergency response 
assets in some cases. For example, in order to restore some measure of primary care services 
to the Rockaways, a mobile clinic was deployed to that community following the storm. 
Additionally, a New Jersey hospital deployed a mobile emergency department to enable 
service provision while the hospital was undergoing repairs from storm damage.
Having preexisting relationships was universally viewed as having been very 
important—This included relationships within professional communities (eg, among 
hospital emergency managers) and across professions (eg, between hospital emergency 
mangers and public health or EMS personnel). These relationships enabled more rapid 
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communication and, in some instances, alternative modes of communication, such as 
personal cell phones or email. These relationships also afforded a level of trust that allowed 
for “handshake” agreements for mutual support. This was generally viewed as positive, but 
in at least 1 case, such an informal agreement that was not followed by a formal agreement 
resulted in conflicts over reimbursement and financial responsibility many months later 
when the bills came due.
Normal procedures and standards of care were adjusted for the purpose of 
doing the most good for the greatest number—Pharmacies and drug treatment 
programs provided extra doses of medication in advance of the storm to those who would 
otherwise run out. Dialysis centers treated some patients in advance and shortened dialysis 
time for others to accommodate more patients in a short time. One hospital participant 
reported implementing a task force to expedite the early discharge of patients who could 
safely be released, thereby freeing up space in the hospital prior to the storm. While early 
discharge is a common element of hospital emergency operations plans, many of these 
activities were ad hoc solutions that took place outside of official chains of command and 
relied heavily on individual and institutional flexibility and improvisation. Whether these 
actions actually achieved better outcomes or in fact may have caused harm to some 
individual patients is an area for further study.
• Political leaders, following the impulse to take action, sometimes deviated from 
established plans, thus complicating the response
Political leaders played an important but not always constructive role. Having high-level 
support from elected officials for emergency managers and public health officials was 
essential to both preparedness and response efforts; however, conflicts between political 
leaders and ad hoc decisions by leaders that were not consistent with response plans or 
strategies created confusion and complicated the response. Specifically, 1 participant 
reported tension between political preferences and decision making during the response to 
Sandy and actions and responsibilities contained in emergency planning documents. This 
participant noted, “If you spend a year writing a plan and educating to the plan and training 
to the plan, then you should use the plan.”
Health Sector Resilience: How the Pieces Fit Together
Lessons from Other Disasters
We analyzed the themes from our research on Hurricane Sandy in the context of analyses of 
the healthcare impacts of other recent US natural disasters.21–30 Much of this literature 
focuses on direct casualties of a disaster or follows the impact on healthcare facilities for 
only a few days. In the immediate several days after a disaster, most injuries are relatively 
minor and result more often from the clean-up and recovery than from direct effects of the 
disaster.22,24 Excluding immediately fatal injuries that do not lead to hospital care, major 
injuries are much less common than minor ones.
Few studies have examined the overall impact of disasters on the healthcare system over the 
course of weeks or months. The literature that does exist is consistent with our findings that 
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after the first few days most post-disaster patients are people who have been displaced from 
routine healthcare and disproportionately come from vulnerable populations.22,23,25,27,28 
This is especially true for hurricanes, in which the number of injuries is fewer and the 
number of displaced patients is much greater than, for example, in earthquakes or tornados. 
Psychological injury is also commonly associated with disasters, both newly arising 
conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder and exacerbation of preexisting 
conditions.31 In fact psychological injury may be much more common than physical 
injury.32 A number of participants in our research reported that, in their experience 
following Sandy, many if not most of their family, friends, and colleagues experienced 
substantial psychological stress. This included first responders, healthcare workers, 
individuals with preexisting behavioral health conditions, and the general public, who faced 
destruction of property; loss of power, water, and food; and evacuation.
A Conceptual Map of Health Sector Resilience
From our analysis and synthesis, we developed a conceptual map of how the various parts of 
the health sector interrelate in the context of a disaster such as Hurricane Sandy. From this 
map we have distilled lessons that we judge to be generally applicable to a variety of 
disasters in a variety of communities. These lessons have informed the creation of a general 
checklist of actions that may be helpful to many different health sector organizations as well 
as supplemental checklists that are specific to various types of organizations. The 
infographic in Figure 1 illustrates our conceptual map. A short animated video explains the 
map in lay terms (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zW5xCzs0spA).
Pieces of the Map
The hazard—Particular characteristics of this hazard, especially its duration and 
geographic scale, adversely affected the health sector beyond what would have been 
expected in a smaller or shorter event. This is similar to findings from other large storms, 
including Hurricane Katina.
The infrastructure—The resilience of the health sector depends on a resilient 
infrastructure. The modern health sector needs electricity, communications (eg, landline 
telephone, cellular telephone, and internet), fuel (for vehicles, heating, and generators), 
water, and transportation. It also depends on an uninterrupted supply chain for medical 
supplies, food, and other essential consumables. Rapid restoration of these goods and 
services is essential when they are compromised, damaged, or made scarce due to a disaster.
The community—The formal healthcare system resides within a larger community 
context that includes civil society, private industry, and public agencies. It is only one part of 
the larger health sector that also includes informal care providers such as family caregivers. 
These informal caregivers are often the liaison with the healthcare system. The healthcare 
work force also lives in the larger community and is affected by whatever affects the 
community. During a disaster both the informal caregivers and healthcare workers may 
become care seekers, in which case they may not be available to provide care. During 
disasters healthy community members seek refuge in hospitals for power, shelter, and 
comfort, further stressing the hospitals.
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The healthcare system—The healthcare system is broad and diverse. Patients seek and 
receive care in many different settings, all of which can be disrupted in a disaster. This 
includes:
• Hospitals (public, private, federal)
■ Acute care
■ Psychiatric
■ Specialty (pediatric, rehabilitation, etc)
• Long-term care facilities
■ Long-term acute care
■ Nursing homes
■ Adult care facilities




■ Convenient care (clinics in pharmacies)
■ Behavioral health
□ General mental health services
□ Mental health intensive case management
□ Substance abuse treatment, including short-term alcohol and 




• Home- and community-based care
■ Home health, including visiting nurses, home physical therapy
■ Home respiratory therapy, including portable and home oxygen, 
continuous positive airway pressure devices, and home mechanical 
ventilators
■ Peritoneal dialysis
■ Monitoring and maintenance of implantable cardiac devices
■ Durable medical equipment and supplies
■ School-based health care
Toner et al. Page 13













■ Prison health care
• Public health
■ An outpatient provider for certain specific issues, such as tuberculosis, 
sexually transmitted infections, and vaccines
■ A regulator of healthcare facilities
■ A funder of some facilities and services provided by others
■ An investigator of outbreaks and surveillance provider
■ A facilitator of coordination of healthcare entities, such as special 
needs or medical shelters, in a disaster
■ A distributor/dispenser of medical pharmaceuticals and supplies
■ A communicator with the public about risks and suggested actions
■ An assessor and regulator of environmental health
Disruption of the operations of various nonhospital healthcare services leads to stress on 
hospitals. In the event of a disaster, in addition to continuing routine (normal) patient 
services and treating event-induced injuries and illnesses, hospitals also may have to absorb 
displaced inpatients from evacuated hospitals and long-term care facilities, displaced 
outpatients (unable to get needed routine care at normal places), and displaced home care 
patients.
The health sector is highly regulated by multiple entities that may have overlapping or 
unclear lines of authority. This includes municipal, county, and state health departments and 
county and state emergency management agencies as well as the federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and accrediting entities like the Joint Commission. 
There may be overlap as well between emergency management and public health at each 
level. These agencies are responsible to or are influenced by elected officials at each level 
who often have ultimate authority under the law. These various authorities can influence 
resilience positively or negatively, depending on how well they plan and work together.
Much of disaster preparedness and response is authorized or constrained by public health 
law. The law provides the legal and policy foundation for disaster response and establishes 
accountability, but in many cases the law is insufficiently detailed or clear, especially 
regarding roles and responsibilities. Key individuals such as hospital executives, public 
health officials, and elected officials may not be aware of the details of existing laws. The 
law can provide legal approval or waive legal requirements for altered delivery of services 
(eg, expanded scope of practice, increased bed capacity, EMS transportation to nonregulated 
medical facilities).
Inherent and adaptive resilience—The resilience of the healthcare system depends on 
inherent factors that exist before a disaster, such as the underlying health and economic 
status of a population, and adaptive factors that occur during and after a disaster, such as the 
ability of the system to respond quickly and effectively and to improvise.
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A resilient health sector depends on each of these parts being resilient and on the various 
parts working well together. The actions that make up our checklist reflect these 
interrelationships and seek to foster resilience of the component parts of the health sector, to 
improve the interaction between the parts, or to enhance inherent or adaptive resilience.
General Checklist of Actions
The following is a checklist of cross-cutting actions that many different health sector 
organizations can implement to foster resilience.* Following this general checklist, we 
provide supplemental checklists that are specific to individual components of the health 
sector. Some of these items may be very challenging to accomplish and may require 
considerable effort over time as well as collaboration with multiple community partners.
□ Healthcare Coalitions
□ The organization participates in their local healthcare coalition to 
promote local collaboration and coordination around healthcare 
emergency preparedness and response. While the core membership of 
the healthcare coalition includes acute care hospitals, public health 
agencies, emergency management and EMS, many other health sector 
entities have a valuable role in resilience and should be participants in 
ongoing preparedness efforts.
□ Continuity of Operation/Business Continuity Plan
□ The organization has a continuity of operations or business continuity 
plan that addresses how it will continue to deliver essential services in 
the event of a disruption. This includes deciding what services are 
truly essential under various circumstances.
□ Relevant portions of the plan are shared with patients, partners, 
vendors, and authorities. Organization confirms that partners and 
vendors on which it relies have their own continuity of operations 
plans, which will enable continued provision of goods and/or services 
on which the organization is dependent.
□ Surge Capacity and Capability
□ The organization has a plan for how it will accommodate increased 
demand for service—that is, how it will “surge” its capacity. This plan 
might include augmenting the current workforce with additional 
personnel from other organizations or jurisdictions or expanding to 
additional sites. Alternatively, this plan might entail altering routine 
operating procedures and policies and even standards of care to expand 
capacity under appropriate circumstances.
*Some items in this checklist may overlap to some extent and are not intended to be mutually exclusive. For example, identifying 
alternative facilities for conducting operations is an essential element of business continuity planning; however, the overall continuity 
of operations planning process and the specific planning for alternative care sites are sufficiently distinct as to warrant separate 
listings.
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□ The organization has plans, thresholds, and other documentation (ie, 
memoranda of understanding) in place to help facilitate an emergency 
evacuation in the event of a widespread disaster.
□ Alternative Care Sites
□ The organization has identified an alternative site(s) from which it can 
provide essential services—for example, where patients can receive 
dialysis or where prescriptions can be picked up. This might include a 
backup location to which the organization’s operations would be 
relocated, another healthcare facility to which patients would be 
referred or transferred, and additional provider sites that could 
augment the capacity of the primary (normal) operating location. This 
might also include sites where external resources can be located—for 
example, identifying buildings that will be used to establish federal 
medical stations.
□ Mobile Healthcare Vehicles and Assets
□ The organization is aware of existing mobile healthcare assets (eg, 
vans, buses, RVs) in their communities and has considered how these 
assets might be used in a disaster such as to augment capacity or to 
serve as an alternative mechanism for care delivery when regular 
facilities are unavailable.
□ The organization has considered or established memoranda of 
understanding or service agreements in advance for how these assets 
may be used and has obtained any regulatory (eg, cross-jurisdiction 
licensing) approval that might be needed.
□ Crisis Standards of Care Planning
□ The organization has a plan for implementing crisis standards of care 
covering the continuum from conventional through contingency to 
crisis standards.33,34 This plan describes how the delivery of health 
care would be prioritized so as to do the most good for the greatest 
number. Its ultimate goal would be to put capabilities in place to avoid 
a transition to crisis care and to attempt to return to conventional care 
as quickly as possible. The plan depends on close coordination with 
emergency response partners at the local, regional, state, and federal 
levels.
□ Early or Alternative Treatment
□ Where possible, the organization devises creative ways to be flexible 
in how care is provided in a disaster. This might include the ability to 
provide care or treatment in advance (eg, early dialysis or early 
dispensing of prescriptions) or in an adjusted manner (eg, providing 
patients with limited take-home supplies of controlled medications) or 
at alternative locations (eg, guest dosing of methadone).
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□ Communication, Public Awareness, and Situational Awareness
□ Mechanisms exist by which the public (care seekers) can obtain 
information on the status and availability of health facilities and 
services (eg, whether a pharmacy or dialysis center is open or closed). 
These mechanisms for ensuring communication with and awareness of 
the public are distinct from communication that must also occur with 
the healthcare and public health workforce to ensure situational 
awareness among providers (see below). At an organizational level, 
this might include status updates on websites and call lines belonging 
to the service provider (eg, the individual pharmacy). On a community 
level, this might include services like 211‡ or 311.§ Such information 
portals or hotlines should be distinct from crisis intervention hotlines 
or emergency services numbers such as 911. Ideally, information 
would be aggregated at a high level to provide a complete picture of 
available health services in an entire community.
□ These mechanisms for ensuring communication with the public are 
incorporated into emergency plans and provisions exist for ensuring 
the continuity of these services in a disaster (ie, there are continuity of 
operations or business continuity plans for 211 or 311 services).
□ A proactive mechanism exists to conduct outreach to patients whose 
health and mental health services are expected to be interrupted (eg, 
pharmacies contact patients who are due for refills at a location that 
has been closed because of storm damage or providers proactively 
assist in connecting patients to services at an alternative location).
□ Engaging and Supporting Workers
□ Healthcare facilities and public agencies engage frontline workers, in 
addition to managers and executives, in planning and preparing for 
disasters. This involves including them in all aspects of preparedness, 
such as developing plans, training personnel, and designing and 
evaluating exercises. Workers should be drawn from a broad sample of 
the workforce. Such involvement would not only improve the 
operability of the plans but also foster better adherence and acceptance 
when implemented.
□ Healthcare facilities and public agencies train their workers on their 
specific roles and responsibilities in a disaster so that the workers can 
understand what is expected of them and how they can contribute to 
the success of the whole.
□ Beyond engaging workers in preparedness, the organization prioritizes 
worker morale and sense of commitment to the organization. 
‡The United Way operates 211 call centers in most states, which provide information about social services in the community.
§Many jurisdictions operate 311 call centers for the public to use for nonemergency issues.
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Willingness of healthcare workers to respond despite personal and 
professional stress and hardship depends on a personal commitment to 
the organization and the community grown out of a sense of loyalty 
and shared mission. Health and public health providers should develop 
systems and strategies to monitor and address the psychological 
impacts of a disaster on their workforces.
□ The organization finds ways to support workers so as to allow them to 
successfully work during stressful times, such as providing family 
daycare or emergency shelter for staff and their families during an 
emergency. Additionally, employers develop programs and strategies 
to help their workers develop personal or family preparedness plans 
and foster their own resilience.
□ Public Health Legal Preparedness
□ Public health emergency legal authorities are reviewed so that it is 
clear what authorities and responsibilities exist and who has which 
powers and responsibilities related, for example, to health facility 
evacuations or the management of patient needs in the setting of scarce 
life-saving or sustaining resources. In addition to clarifying the legal 
authority of public health officials, the roles and authorities of elected 
officials and emergency management officials should also be reviewed 
and communicated.
□ Flexibility
□ The organization seeks ways to foster improvisation and flexibility in 
response to unknown circumstances. This is distinct from the ability of 
people to be adaptable, although personnel within organizations should 
be encouraged and rewarded for improvisation. It is the nature of large 
organizations to be conservative, risk averse, and rule-bound, but this 
inhibits the adaptation that is essential for resilience. Organizations 
should consider creating broad-based committees to review internal 
policies, practices, and cultural norms that hinder flexibility in disaster 
response.
□ Infrastructure Continuity and Restoration
□ The organization has undertaken efforts to “harden” its facilities, 
making them less vulnerable to disruption by a variety of likely 
hazards. This might include, in the case of a hurricane, for example, 
moving generators, fuel pumps, and related electrical equipment out of 
basements, installing watertight doors, or building berms.
□ The organization has robust response plans for loss of power, potable 
and nonpotable water, and communication and information technology 
infrastructure. This includes emergency backup systems (and perhaps 
redundant backup in some cases), adequate fuel supplies for 
emergency generators and reliable sources for fuel resupply, and 
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procedures for continuing operations without this infrastructure. To the 
extent possible, these plans should minimize dependence on external 
help and maximize self-reliance. Plans should consider the possibility 
of prolonged interruption of services. There should be plans as well for 
rapid recovery of services when the infrastructure is restored.
□ In addition to having redundant backup communications using 
different technologies, organizations should have a strategy for dealing 
with limited communications and information flow (ie, determining 
what information is essential).
□ Healthcare facilities are identified as critical infrastructure in 
community disaster planning, and, therefore, jurisdictions prioritize 
rapid restoration of power and other essential utilities to all electricity- 
and utility-dependent healthcare facilities (eg, hospitals, nursing 
homes, long-term care facilities, dialysis centers).
□ Transportation Continuity, Restoration, and Access
□ The organization plans for transportation interruptions and considers 
how they will adapt to such interruptions, including possible 
alternative transportation for and sheltering of staff and patients.
□ Jurisdictions plan for rapid restoration of transportation including mass 
transit, roadways, and vehicle fuel. Fuel is needed for emergency 
vehicles but also for essential personnel using their own private 
vehicles to travel to and from sites of patient care.
□ Policies are reviewed to limit as much as possible large-scale 
restriction of local travel, such as closing all access roads, shutting 
down mass transit, or restricting travel to “essential personnel” during 
disasters.
□ Downstream consequences of travel restrictions (especially on the 
health sector), such as interruption of supply chains and loss of staff, 
are carefully considered and planned for.
□ If travel restrictions must be implemented, provisions are made to 
enable healthcare, allied health, and support personnel who are all 
essential to the delivery of health services to travel to and from all care 
sites, not just hospitals. These provisions should include family 
caregivers.
□ Jurisdictions work in concert with healthcare facilities to ensure that 
patients are able to travel to and access needed care after disasters and 
in particular when travel restrictions are implemented.
□ Supply Chains
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□ The organization has plans for maintaining needed supply delivery 
during and after a disaster. The plan includes redundant supply sources 
and sources of emergency alternatives.
□ The organization has determined which supplies are mission-critical 
and has plans for crisis standards of care if mission-critical supplies 
run out.
□ The organization has stockpiled or worked with others in the region to 
stockpile essential mission-critical supplies that are sufficient to last 
until resupply can be reasonably expected.
□ The organization has established written assurances with essential 
suppliers in advance of an event to assure timely resupply.
Supplemental Checklists for Components of the Health Sector
The following supplemental checklists are specific to different entities that play important 
roles in health sector resilience to disasters. They should be used in conjunction with the 
general checklist above. In some cases the specific checklists repeat actions included in the 
general checklist for emphasis. All users of this document are encouraged to read the general 
checklist first and then read the specific checklist that applies to them. Many of the items in 
the checklists can be found in other existing guidance, such as from the Joint Commission or 
CMS,35 but here we emphasize those items that had greatest salience to health professionals 
who experienced Sandy and that in our judgment are generalizable to other disasters in other 
locations.
Hospitals
□ In addition to all-hazard preparedness activities as mandated by the Joint 
Commission and CMS, and encouraged by the ASPR Hospital Preparedness 
Program, including participation in healthcare coalitions, hospitals place greater 
emphasis on being prepared for a surge of patients displaced from normal care 
and needing services not commonly provided, such as outpatient dialysis and 
methadone maintenance.
□ Hospitals are prepared for community members seeking refuge (eg, food, water, 
shelter, electrical outlets, accommodations for displaced persons accompanied 
by a pet) and, in addition, have preestablished agreements with nearby 
community institutions to help provide similar assistance if conditions permit.
□ Hospitals create an algorithm for evacuation decision making that reflects a clear 
understanding of who has the legal authority and responsibility for decision 
making about evacuation and under what circumstances evacuation is 
appropriate.
□ The evidence base for assessing the risk of precautionary versus 
emergency evacuation is reviewed and incorporated into the algorithm.
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□ Hospitals engage in planning with their local emergency management agency, 
EMS, and healthcare coalitions to create a centralized system to coordinate 
patient transportation and distribution in case of facility evacuation, including if 
multiple simultaneous evacuations are needed.
□ Hospitals carefully review EMTALA regulations as they apply to disasters and 
seek clarification of any unclear aspects.
□ Hospitals have processes in place needed for evacuation:
□ the ability to provide secure and confidential access to patient medical 
information during disaster response and recovery, identification of 
patient destination, and
□ sharing resources and returning resources to source healthcare facility 
at the conclusion of the evacuation period.
□ Hospital senior executives recognize the importance of preparedness to their 
organization’s and community’s long-term well-being and engage personally in 
ensuring their organization’s resilience.
□ Hospital senior executives recruit clinician champions to be actively engaged in 
preparedness activities.
Long-Term Care Facilities
□ Nursing homes, long-term acute care facilities, and residential adult care 
facilities prioritize their own resilience to disaster. They have emergency 
operation plans and continuity of operations plans that anticipate prolonged loss 
of essential infrastructure.
□ Long-term care facilities’ emergency plans include the circumstances under 
which evacuation might be needed, where the residents would go, and how they 
would get there. Specific arrangements, memoranda of understanding, and/or 
contracts are executed with any outside entities that would be needed to aid in 
sheltering in place or evacuating.
□ Long-term care facilities create an algorithm for evacuation decision making that 
reflects a clear understanding of who has the legal authority and responsibility 
for decision making about evacuation and under what circumstances evacuation 
is appropriate.
□ The evidence base for assessing the risk of precautionary versus emergency 
evacuation is reviewed and incorporated into the algorithm.
□ Long-term care facilities that are part of larger organizations, such as nursing 
home chains or integrated healthcare networks, actively participate in the larger 
organizations’ preparedness activities.
□ Long-term care facilities are able to provide secure and confidential access to 
patient medical information during disaster response and recovery.
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□ Long-term care facilities have robust plans for loss of power, water, and 
communication and information technology infrastructure. This includes 
emergency backup systems, adequate fuel supplies for emergency generators 
and reliable sources for fuel resupply, and procedures for continuing operations 
without this infrastructure. To the extent possible, these plans should minimize 
dependence on external help and maximize self-reliance. Plans should consider 
the possibility of prolonged outages. There should be plans as well for rapid 
recovery of services when the infrastructure is restored.
Outpatient Medical Facilities
□ Physician offices and all types of outpatient medical clinics place greater 
emphasis on their own resilience to disaster. They have emergency operation 
plans and continuity of operations plans that anticipate prolonged loss of 
essential infrastructure.
□ Outpatient medical facilities can securely and confidentially access patient 
medical information during disaster response and recovery.
□ Outpatient medical facilities have robust plans for loss of power, water, and 
communication and information technology infrastructure. This includes 
emergency backup systems, adequate fuel supplies for emergency generators 
and reliable sources for fuel resupply, and procedures for continuing operations 
without this infrastructure. To the extent possible, these plans should minimize 
dependence on external help and maximize self-reliance. Plans should consider 
the possibility of prolonged outages. There should be plans as well for rapid 
recovery of services when the infrastructure is restored.
□ Outpatient medical facilities that are part of larger organizations, such as urgent 
care chains or integrated healthcare networks, actively participate in the larger 
organizations’ preparedness activities.
Behavioral Health Providers
□ Mental health and substance abuse clinics emphasize their own resilience to 
disaster. They have emergency operation plans and continuity of operations 
plans that anticipate prolonged loss of essential infrastructure. There should be 
plans as well for rapid recovery of services when the infrastructure is restored.
□ Behavioral health providers that are part of larger organizations, such as mental 
health networks or integrated healthcare networks, actively participate in the 
larger organizations’ preparedness activities.
□ Where possible, behavioral health providers devise creative ways to be flexible 
in how care is provided in a disaster. This might include the ability to provide 
treatment in advance (eg, early dispensing of prescriptions) or in an altered 
manner (eg, providing patients with limited take-home supplies of controlled 
medications) or at alternative locations (eg, guest dosing of methadone).
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□ Behavioral health providers can provide secure and confidential access to patient 
medical information during disaster response and recovery.
□ Work with state regulators to create an electronic system by which 
alternative care locations (eg, other behavioral health clinics and 
hospital emergency departments) can access patient dosing 
information.
□ Behavioral health providers review relevant public health laws and regulations as 
they relate to disasters, especially those that relate to crisis standards of care and 
the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances.
□ Behavioral health providers are prepared to assist the healthcare workforce and 
acutely affected populations, as well as existing clients.
□ Behavioral health providers train non–behavioral health first responders and 
healthcare providers in recognizing potential mental health issues and delivering 
simple preventive techniques, such as psychological first aid.
Pharmacies
□ Pharmacies emphasize their own resilience to disaster. They have emergency 
operation plans and continuity of operations plans that anticipate prolonged loss 
of essential infrastructure.
□ Pharmacies can securely access patients’ prescription information during 
disaster response and recovery.
□ Pharmacies that are part of larger organizations, such as drug store chains or 
integrated healthcare networks, actively participate in the larger organizations’ 
preparedness activities.
□ Where possible, pharmacies devise creative ways to be flexible in how care is 
provided in a disaster. This might include the ability to provide treatment in 
advance (eg, early dispensing of prescriptions) or in an altered manner (eg, 
providing patients with greater than normal supplies of medications) or at 
alternative locations (eg, transferring prescription to another pharmacy).
□ Pharmacies review relevant public health laws and regulations. The law can 
provide legal approval or waive legal requirements for adjusted delivery of 
services (eg, expanded scope of practice and alternative care facilities).
Correctional Health Facilities
□ Health clinics and infirmaries in prisons and jails prioritize their own resilience 
to disaster. They have emergency operation plans and continuity of operations 
plans that anticipate prolonged loss of essential infrastructure.
□ Correctional health facilities’ plans include the circumstances under which 
evacuation might be needed, where the inmates would go, and how they would 
get there. Specific arrangements, memoranda of understanding, and/ or contracts 
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are executed with any outside entities that would be needed to aid in sheltering 
in place or evacuating.
Public Health Departments (State and Local)
□ The public health department has a continuity of operations plan addressing how 
it will continue to deliver essential services in the event of a disruption. This 
includes deciding what services are truly essential under various circumstances.
□ The public health department has a plan for how it will accommodate increased 
demand for service, including augmenting current workforce with additional 
personnel from other organizations or jurisdictions or reassigning personnel.
□ The public health department has identified an alternative site(s) from which it 
can provide essential services.
□ Public health emergency legal authorities are reviewed so that it is clear what 
authorities and responsibilities exist and who has which powers and 
responsibilities related, for example, to health facility evacuations and alterations 
in standards of care.
□ To the extent possible under law, public health departments encourage or require 
that all organizations have robust response plans for loss of power, water, and 
communication and information technology infrastructure. This includes 
emergency backup systems (and perhaps redundant backup in some cases), 
adequate fuel supplies for emergency generators and reliable sources for fuel 
resupply, and procedures for continuing operations without this infrastructure.
□ The public health department working with other local and state agencies 
prioritizes rapid restoration of power and other essential utilities to all 
electricity- and utility-dependent healthcare facilities (eg, hospitals, nursing 
homes, long-term care facilities, dialysis centers, etc). Healthcare facilities are 
identified as critical infrastructure in community disaster planning.
□ If travel restrictions must be implemented, the public health department works 
with other agencies to enable healthcare, allied health, and support personnel 
who are all essential to the delivery of health services to travel to and from care 
sites (not just hospitals). This should include family caregivers. The public 
health department works in concert with healthcare facilities to ensure that 
patients are able to travel to and access the needed care after disasters and in 
particular when travel restrictions are implemented.
□ The public health department ensures the development of plans for special needs 
and medical shelters, which may or may not be operated by public health 
agencies. Plans ensure that special needs and medical shelters have adequate 
capacity (including space, staffing, and supplies) for expected volume of citizens 
requiring electrical power and other assistance related to their medical 
conditions. Plans address how public health and safety (eg, prevention of 
infectious disease outbreaks, food safety) at medical shelters will be ensured as 
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well as how shelter residents will be connected to care that is not available onsite 
(eg, drug treatment programs).
Patient Transport Providers
□ Emergency medical services and other patient transport providers (private 
ambulance, ambulette, etc) have a continuity of operations plan addressing how 
they will continue to deliver essential services in the event of a disruption.
□ EMS agencies have a plan for crisis standards of care that address staffing, scope 
of practice, patient destination, and the like. The plan incorporates close 
coordination with local healthcare providers and regional, state, and federal 
partners.
□ EMS agencies review public health emergency legal authorities so that it is clear 
what authorities and responsibilities exist and who has which powers and 
responsibilities related, for example, to health facility evacuations and 
adjustments in standards of care.
Home and Community-Based Care Providers
□ Home care agencies, companies, and providers of all types emphasize their own 
resilience to disaster. They have emergency operation plans and a continuity of 
operations plan that anticipate prolonged loss of essential infrastructure.
□ They have robust plans for loss of power, water, and communication both to 
their own offices and to their patients. This includes emergency backup systems, 
adequate fuel supplies for emergency generators and reliable sources for fuel 
resupply, and procedures for continuing operations without this infrastructure.
□ Home care agencies, companies, and providers can securely access patient 
medical information during disaster response and recovery.
□ They have plans for dealing with degraded transportation capabilities.
□ They have a process for prioritizing (triage) which patients are to be seen.
□ They have mutual aid arrangements with other home and community-based care 
organizations.
□ Home care providers that are part of larger organizations, such as home care 
chains or integrated healthcare networks, actively participate in the larger 
organizations’ preparedness activities.
Local Elected Officials and Jurisdictions
□ Local elected officials ensure that every government agency, utility, and 
infrastructure provider has a continuity of operations plan or business continuity 
plan addressing how it will continue to deliver essential services in the event of a 
disruption. Local elected officials ensure that every government agency, utility, 
and infrastructure provider has a plan for how it will accommodate increased 
demand for service, including augmenting current workforce and altering 
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routine operating procedures and policies to expand capacity under appropriate 
circumstances.
□ Local elected officials ensure that every government agency, utility, and 
infrastructure provider has identified an alternative site(s) from which it can 
provide essential services.
□ Local elected officials use their ties with community-based organizations to 
engage them in planning for disasters. Ideally, this engagement is accomplished 
through a mature healthcare coalition.
□ Local elected officials ensure that procurements and contracts with community-
based organizations and service providers include provisions in contracts 
requiring development and occasional exercising of emergency response plans, 
including engagement with the healthcare coalition and other emergency 
preparedness and response partners, and sufficient additional funding to do this 
work.
□ Local elected officials have been consulted on plans for crisis standards of care.
□ Local elected officials review public health emergency legal authorities so that it 
is clear what authorities and responsibilities exist and who has which powers and 
responsibilities related, for example, to health facility evacuations and alterations 
in standards of care.
□ Local elected officials work through their existing incident command structures 
(jurisdictional emergency management and public health agencies) to take 
actions during disasters.
Patients and Families
□ All members of the public should take actions to enhance their personal disaster 
resilience, such as:
□ Maintaining a several-day supply of water, food, cash, and medicines;
□ Considering the types of disasters they are most likely to experience 
and what measures are likely to reduce their vulnerability;
□ This information could be provided by the local emergency 
management or public health agency.
□ Considering what items (eg, important papers and medications) they might need 
if they must evacuate on short notice and planning where they might go;
□ Planning different means by which they can contact family and friends in a 
disaster and inform them of their plans; and
□ Ensuring that they have redundant mechanisms to access information in a 
disaster, including, if electrical power is out, a battery-powered or hand-crank 
radio.
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□ Above and beyond these general measures, patients with serious chronic 
diseases require additional actions. A comprehensive list of actions for all types 
of patients is beyond the scope of this checklist, as is a completely detailed list 
of actions for any particular condition, but the following list addresses some 
more common situations:
□ Patients and their families who depend on life-sustaining medications 
should maintain a maximal supply of medications at all times and 
know how to refill medications in an emergency. They should inquire 
about their pharmacy’s emergency plan and alternative sites if their 
usual pharmacy is closed. If there is warning of an impending disaster, 
such as a hurricane, they should request advance dispensing of 
essential medications. They should maintain a hard-copy list of all 
medications in case their pharmacy or medical records are not 
accessible. For medications that require refrigeration, patients and their 
families should have backup plans to keep medications cold during 
prolonged power outages.
□ All patients and their families who depend on life-sustaining home 
care should be familiar with the emergency plans of their home care 
providers. Since many home care patients depend on more than one 
provider, they should be aware of the plans of each. They should know 
how to remain in contact with the providers in an emergency. They 
should have a backup plan if their provider is not able to reach them.
□ All patients and their families who depend on life-sustaining electrical 
devices at home should have access to adequate emergency power 
sources, such as batteries or an emergency generator.
□ Patients and their families who depend on life-sustaining supplies at 
home (eg, peritoneal dialysis solution, oxygen, or intravenous 
medications) should ensure they have at least several days’ worth of 
supplies at all times, know how to get resupplied in an emergency, and 
know what to do if re-supplies do not arrive.
□ Patients and their families who depend on life-sustaining equipment at 
home should know what to do in case of evacuation and how the 
equipment can be moved.
□ Some jurisdictions have compiled registries of medically vulnerable 
individuals; patients and their families should inquire about such 
registries with their home care providers, utilities, police and fire 
departments, and public health or emergency management agencies.
□ Dialysis patients (either peritoneal or hemodialysis) should know what 
alternative dietary guidelines they should follow if their dialysis is 
delayed.
□ Patients and their families who require complicated or uncommon 
ongoing treatments (eg, cancer chemotherapy) should maintain copies 
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of their medical records and treatment protocols or regimens with them 
if they are evacuated or if they need to seek alternative sites of care.
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In one instance, there was a narrow window, during low tide, when patients could be 
safely evacuated from a hospital that had sustained flooding and lost power. When EMS 
arrived to execute the hospital-initiated evacuation, patients were not packaged and ready 
for transport. Patients were still in their rooms, rather than staged in the lobby as EMS 
had expected; valuable time was lost during a narrow window in which evacuation could 
be executed without endangering patients, staff, and EMS providers.
Additionally, there was a miscommunication about the destination to which patients 
would be sent. While the evacuating hospital had coordinated with senior officials at the 
receiving facility, this information had not been relayed to line staff at the receiving 
hospital. When EMS arrived with the patients, they were turned away and were forced to 
attempt to find beds at other facilities.
The consequences of this miscommunication were exacerbated by the fact that most 
patients were evacuated in medical ambulance buses, which could carry around 20 
patients, as opposed to traditional ambulances, which can carry 2 or 3 patients at most. 
Consequently, when the receiving facility was unprepared to accept the busload of 
patients, it created a much larger challenge than reallocating patients from a single 
ambulance. The miscommunication was ultimately resolved and patients were eventually 
accepted at the initial receiving facility, but valuable time during which the buses could 
have evacuated another round of patients was lost. It was evident that responsibility and 
processes for coordination of patient evacuation were insufficient.
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